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Date: Thu, 24 Apr 2014 16:20:10 +0200
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From: =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Jorge_Tim=F3n?= <jtimon@monetize.io>
To: Peter Todd <pete@petertodd.org>
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Cc: Bitcoin Development <bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] 0 confirmation txs using replace-by-fee
 and game theory
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On 4/24/14, Peter Todd <pete@petertodd.org> wrote:
> ...
> With replace-by-fee scorched-earth the success rate of such
> double-spends would be significantly reduced as the attacker would need
> to get lucky with bad propagation not just once, but twice in a row.

Interesting.

>> Replace-by-fee and child-pays-for parent cannot be prohibited by a
>> protocol rule.
>> I believe all miners will eventually implement these policies because
>> it is the more rational way for them to prioritize transactions.
>> Finally I hope they do because it would make 0-confirmation
>> transactions possible as described in this post.
>> So I can't find any reasoning against replace-by-fee unless my example
>> is terribly flawed.
>> Am I missing something?
>
> A few things:
>
> 1) Replace-by-fee doesn't protect against sybil attacks; only

No worse than the current situation.

> 2) Replace-by-fee scorched earth does require you to keep private keys
> online to sign the replacements. Not a big deal, but it's yet another
> reason why you wouldn't want to use it for high-value stuff.

High-value transactions should wait for several confirmations.

> 3) It doesn't directly solve finney attacks(1) where the miner mines the
> transaction in private. However finney attacks are only relevant if
> there is high centralization of hashing power, and all other proposed
> mechanisms, e.g. coinbase reallocation, themselves do a lot of harm to
> decentralization. (just look at how coinbase reallocation lets large
> pools bully smaller miners out of business by blacklisting their blocks)

Again, no worse than the current situation. And regular double-spends
attacks are much simpler than finney attacks.

> One interesting thing with regard to finney attacks and replace-by-fee
> though is that enforcing hasher visibility of the blocks they are mining
> - what getblocktemplate was meant to do voluntarily - lets any hasher
> detect a finney attack double-spend and broadcast it. They have a weak
> incentive to do so - the scorched earth reply is a high-fee transaction
> of course and pre-broadcasting transactions makes blocks propagate
> faster - at which point you're back to a public double-spend.  Enforcing
> visibility of block contents to hashers is definitely a good thing for
> decentralization.

Where can I read more about "enforcing hashing visibility of block contents"?
Sounds somewhat similar to p2pool to me but I'm not sure I understand it.