Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 31D781915 for ; Sun, 4 Oct 2015 06:46:29 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: domain auto-whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mx1.riseup.net (mx1.riseup.net [198.252.153.129]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E856F100 for ; Sun, 4 Oct 2015 06:46:27 +0000 (UTC) Received: from piha.riseup.net (unknown [10.0.1.162]) (using TLSv1 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (Client CN "*.riseup.net", Issuer "COMODO RSA Domain Validation Secure Server CA" (verified OK)) by mx1.riseup.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6517EC1460; Sat, 3 Oct 2015 23:46:27 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=riseup.net; s=squak; t=1443941187; bh=V6wOwydyPAeU5SXcwSI5VCuBjLRAtyV9gNeIulWgGt8=; h=Date:From:To:CC:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=Re4up7L0Vt8nnFqGWNm2zPQZEwtOYpFP0W8D2oEYPdTtOHGRf8IU0TJUg3t6Vxdm6 FKUKD4JdTaMudpw7ZqreRI/3eNblpgW+8SRje/Mx4Ao8tGAMpJMKfNkeEw+UhY+Dtw YcG3Yg1aXVCSKUVIS0By5OaWosxUoq+t99Af2Vc0= Received: from [127.0.0.1] (localhost [127.0.0.1]) (Authenticated sender: odinn.cyberguerrilla) with ESMTPSA id B4ABF1416FD Message-ID: <5610CB2F.90002@riseup.net> Date: Sun, 04 Oct 2015 06:46:07 +0000 From: odinn MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Chris Pacia , Peter Todd , justusranvier@riseup.net, gmaxwell@gmail.com References: <6EC9DDF352DC4838AE9B088AB372428A25E1F42A@DS04> <20150817212912.GA15817@muck> <55D4124B.6070700@riseup.net> In-Reply-To: <55D4124B.6070700@riseup.net> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Virus-Scanned: clamav-milter 0.98.7 at mx1.riseup.net X-Virus-Status: Clean X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW,T_RP_MATCHES_RCVD, UNPARSEABLE_RELAY autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Incentives to run full nodes X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 04 Oct 2015 06:46:29 -0000 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Hello, Some background on this.... A very long while ago I posted to the bitcoin-development mailing list some ABIS concepts having to do with microdonations: https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2013-December/00 3791.html https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2014-January/004 049.html And an interesting post (which led me to explore BCN) via nullc: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=7765455 (posted 1 & 1/3 year ago). Anyway, some long while ago this discussion came up about "Incentives to run full nodes," and the last post in the thread was here: https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2014-June/006083 .html Since that time, some new developments have come to light which the participants in that thread may find interesting; Please see in part, https://bytecoin.org/news/bytecoin-wallet-1.0.8-release-introduces-micro - -donations/ This presents a working implementation in BCN; the concept as implemented there is arguably viable in BTC as well. Please explore, play with, discuss, etc. Cheers, - - O odinn: > Potentially relevant... > > "Incentivizing the running of full nodes" > > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2014-June/0060 28 > > .html > > (However, the issue to which I referred here is now closed) > > View whole thread: > > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2014-June/thre ad > > .html#6028 > > On 08/17/2015 02:44 PM, Chris Pacia via bitcoin-dev wrote: > >> On Aug 17, 2015 5:29 PM, "Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev" >> > > wrote: From the >> point of view of a >>> wallet, it's not very secure to use Hearn-style SPV mode, and >>> volunteers running full nodes doesn't help things. Sybil >>> attacking the IP address space is pretty easy in comparison to >>> aquiring hashing power sufficient to create false >>> confirmations, so any attacker able to do the former will >>> likely be running the full node you're connecting too anyway. >>> Ultimately, Hearn-style SPV is a close approximation to just >>> trusting anyone with a non-trivial amount of hashing power. >>> (and getting that is surprisingly easy, e.g. w/ SPV mining) > >> Can you explain how the spv node fails against an attacker with a >> non-trivial amount of hash power where a full node doesn't? To >> attack an spv wallet that is waiting for 6 or 10 confirmations, >> you would not only need to Sybil them but also summon a massive >> amount of hashing power to create a chain of headers (while >> forgoing the opportunity to mine valid blocks with that hash >> power). > >> But could someone with that much hash power not Sybil a full >> node and give them a chain for valid blocks (but on an orphan >> fork)? The failure model doesn't seem specific to spv to me. > > > >> _______________________________________________ bitcoin-dev >> mailing list bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org >> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > > > - -- http://abis.io ~ "a protocol concept to enable decentralization and expansion of a giving economy, and a new social good" https://keybase.io/odinn -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQEcBAEBCgAGBQJWEMsvAAoJEGxwq/inSG8CcU8IAMJ+ZYMFzjETUDEZNyUnVd3v SJCNauufTOcqxLzQoGIj4Y66PDnk9doRy/KJUGhKNtg4vjxiEk+GGHRH02ktvnQB 6MGuDCJS+MLeGi2W2QMr1NdHl09kRo306F5ZgjtZnOqX0mhwhOrIUylpoevcBnSQ maJ5hpmxqyhxozEyYyu50HwcMQrXeWKZ8G0VSkTqmY5wf0s98MGrFLWSujwsva0e p4hvG6YgBH85ne7dnBSH/sySreJpRMA0aac/+1j9U3LVvMTsmuaPc71aGI791o/y +KV+UZ8bgHldfi+NSK8wA4eRi4JQrt+ruE63XlfYl29gWINqsGeVtpW/W3jeDnI= =KDER -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----